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ABSTRACT: This thesis studies Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017], which is commonly known as the first legalisation of 
same-sex marriage in Asia.  The Taiwanese legalisation of same-sex 
marriage was not decided by the congress (Legislative Yuan) by a 
majority vote; on a contrary, it was decided by the constitutional 
court (Judicial Yuan) in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017].  
In its court order recognising same-sex “unions,” the Judicial Yuan 
established a period of no more than two years during which the 
Legislative Yuan must settle the precise form of legalisation that such 
recognition of same-sex “unions” will take.  Hence, the Legislative 
Yuan must decide the form of legalisation, either same-sex 
“marriage” or same-sex “civil partnership,” in no more than two 
years, and will accordingly face public acceptance or criticism of its 
decision.  In other words, the Judicial Yuan legalised same-sex 
“unions” in light of its ideological attitudes but strategically avoided 
being criticised by the mass public. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The first legalisation of same-sex marriage in Asia was 
decided by the supreme judicial body of Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan, 
through Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017].  The case was 
first appealed by Chi Chia-Wei on 20 August 20151 and subsequently 
appealed by the Taipei City Government on 4 November 2015.2  The 
two appeals were consolidated by the Judicial Yuan, and the 
conditional leave was granted on 10 February 2017.3  The case was 
heard on 24 March of the same year,4 and the judicial decision 
                                                                                                               
 1 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Judicial Yuan Proclamation (司法院新聞稿) No.106-015 (Feb. 10, 2017). 
 4 Id. 
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rendering the illegalisation of same-sex “unions” as unconstitutional 
was held and promulgated on 24 May.5 
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan is known for its judicial 
assertiveness,6 and its precedents imply that it is de facto7 and de jure8 
the sole constitutional organ that enjoys the power of the last word in 
politics – e.g., the Justices dismissed Taiwan’s authoritarian congress 
for peaceful democratisation in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990] and struck down as unconstitutional the Additional Articles of 
the Constitution of R.O.C. (1999) in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.499 [2000].  Hence, it is not a surprise in Taiwan when the Judicial 
Yuan orders the Legislative Yuan to legislate whatever the Court has 
decided, and we can also discover this pattern in Taiwan’s same-sex 
marriage case.9  The Justices held: 
This Court thus orders that the authorities concerned shall 
amend or enact the laws as appropriate in accordance with the ruling 
of this Interpretation, within two years after the announcement of this 
Interpretation.  It is within the discretion of the authorities concerned 
to determine the formality (for example, amendment of the Marriage 
Chapter, enactment of a special Chapter in Part IV on Family of the 
Civil Code, enactment of a special law, or other formality) for 
achieving the equal protection of the freedom of marriage for two 
persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of intimate and 
exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life.10 
However, public opinion polls in Taiwan between 2012 and 
2017 show that the Justices’ decision does not enjoy wide public 
support,11 because public opinion in relation to the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage is sharply divided.  The Judicial Yuan’s 
precedents suggest that the Court is supposed to apply the political 
                                                                                                               
 5 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
(2017). 
 6 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEWS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
IN ASIAN CASES 106-157 (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 7 E.g., SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第261 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
261] (1990); SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 (2000). 
 8 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan) with MINGUO XIANFA art. 171 
(1947) (Taiwan). 
 9 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
(2017). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See generally VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 12-15 (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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question doctrine,12 but the Justices here chose to make a concrete 
decision;13 this thesis considers this aspect as a sincere and attitudinal 
decision on the part of the Justices.14  Nevertheless, the Justices made 
a strategic decision15 that leaves “the formality for achieving the 
equal protection of the freedom of marriage”16 to “the authorities 
concerned,”17 i.e., the Legislative Yuan.  In other words, the Justices 
decided only on the legalisation of same-sex unions,18 but 
strategically left the political hot potato to the Legislative Yuan, 
which is obliged to make a decision between the legalisation of same-
sex marriage and that of same-sex civil partnerships. 
2. THEORETICAL INSIGHTS 
According to Alan Carter, morality implies freedom because 
there is no moral problem if a person has no free will to make 
decisions.19  Hence, the German criminal law accordingly regards any 
conduct without freedom as a human tool20 (Menschliches 
Werkzeug), i.e., indirect perpetration (Mittelbare Täterschaft).21  
However, it is obvious that in the modern era freedom is sometimes 
considered a threat to morality, and the dilemma between freedom 
and morality described by Carter is this: 
If freedom lacks value, then the problem of morality seems to 
require no answer.  On the other hand, if one’s personal freedom does 
have value, and if we are to take moral prescriptions seriously, then 
                                                                                                               
 12 E.g., SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
328] (1993); see SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
748] (2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting); SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解
釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting). 
 13 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
(2017). 
 14 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (Cambridge University Press 2002) (asserting that “the 
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological 
attitudes and values of the justices”). 
 15 See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1-21 (CQ 
Press 1998). 
 16 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
(2017). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Alan Carter, Morality and Freedom, 53 PHILOS. Q. 161, 161 (2003). 
 20 IRYNA MARCHUK, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 205 (2014). 
 21 Id. 
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it appears that we need to provide some answer to the question of 
what could justify discounting that value.  And were we able to do so, 
we would have provided an answer to the problem of morality.  This 
implies that if we want to justify moral principles, then we need only 
consider the worst case, namely, when it is accepted that the freedom 
to choose is valuable.22 
The “worst case”23 this thesis has proposed to justify moral 
principles in relation to the legalisation of same-sex marriage is to 
question whether morality constitutes the cause of legal 
discrimination, i.e., is it just to discriminate against lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals legally under moral 
hazard concerns?  In other words, is society, through its legislative 
institutions, entitled to constitutionally legislate a discriminatory law 
in accordance with morality?24  As far as this thesis is concerned, 
morals form the source of law, as illustrated by Hans Kelsen,25 but 
not the source of lawful discrimination. 
There is no doubt that the concept of “marriage” in 
accordance with morals is a derivative of heterosexuality, as the 
concept is often associated with a societal need to establish stable and 
legal unions for the purpose of procreation and child rearing.  
However, Chris Beasley, Heather Brook, and Mary Holmes indicate 
that heterosexual marriage seems to be only a natural preference, 
because procreation is never deemed a requisite of marriage.26  
Hence, the moral sense of marriage, which narrows the definition to 
heterosexual marriage, reflects the sexual preference of the majority 
of people and raises a legal and constitutional question: the 
derivatives for the majority on the basis of heterosexuality are legally 
and safely protected as an “institution,”27 but the absence of an equal 
institution ensuring derivatives for the minority, which is based upon 
                                                                                                               
 22 Carter, supra note 19, at 163. 
 23 Id. 
 24 But see R V. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 
115 (Lord Hoffmann, holding that “Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to 
fundamental principles of human rights”). 
 25 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 62-63 (Max Knight trans., University of 
California Press 1967). 
 26 CHRIS BEASLEY ET AL., HETEROSEXUALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 28-29 (2012). 
 27 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting). 
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homosexuality, has traditionally been deemed legally acceptable.28  
On what grounds can such a great de jure inequity be rationalised? 
Moreover, in modern societies and at least in terms of most 
developed countries, both heterosexuality and homosexuality are 
lawful, in both essence and behaviour, so the legal dilemma 
continues: how can the law provide no protection for lawful 
behaviour?  When a heterosexual couple becomes engaged, the law 
provides them with the institution of marriage.29  However, when a 
homosexual couple becomes engaged, the law provides them nothing 
de jure and forces them to maintain their relationship de facto.  Both 
sexual preferences and behaviours are lawful, but why does the law 
treat them unequally? 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage is not so much a claim to the freedom of marriage as a claim 
to equality,30 i.e., that LGBT individuals should be regarded as equal 
to the majority of the people de jure, irrespective of sexual 
preference.31  Unless the law stipulates against homosexuality, in the 
same manner that the law prohibits incest, marriage should not be 
restricted to heterosexual couples.  In other words, whether LGBT 
people are entitled to freely marry is not the core of the matter; the 
heart of the issue, according to this thesis, is by what ground the 
freedom to marry should be limited to heterosexuality. 
3. STATISTICAL INSIGHTS 
As a matter of fact, Taiwanese public opinion in relation to 
the legalisation of same-sex marriage is sharply divided, and it can be 
read differently: either support for or opposition to the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage constitutes at least one-third of the population in 
Taiwan, and it also depends on how such legalisation is defined.  For 
example, a public opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Justice32 
showed that support for legal protection of same-sex marriage 
                                                                                                               
 28 Id. 
 29 THE LAW & SOCIETY READER II 339 (Erik Larson & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2014). 
 30 Mock Constitutional Trial No.2 (Nigel N.T. Li, concurring), 253 TAIWAN L. J. 91, 
106-107 (2014). 
 31 Id. 
 32 ROC Ministry of Justice, Baozhang Tongxing Banlu Quanyi Fangshi Zhi Minyi 
Diaocha (保障同性伴侶權益方式之民意調查) [Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the 
Form of Legal Protection of Sam-sex Unions] 3 (Dec. 29, 2015). 
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comprised 56.3 per cent33 of the total population in December 2015; 
however, only 35.3 per cent of the population supported the 
legalisation of same-sex “marriage,” along with 21 per cent of the 
population that only supported the legalisation of same-sex “civil 
partnership.”34  Nevertheless, most of the public opinion polls listed 
in Table 1 have not differentiated the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage from civil partnership.  Hence, these surveys in effect were 
precisely polls in relation to the legalisation of same-sex “unions,” 
rather than polls on the legalisation of same-sex “marriage.” 
                                                                                                               
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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Table 1: Public Opinion Polls on Legalisation of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 2012–2017 
Public Opinion Poll Support Oppose N/A 
TVBS Poll Center (Apr. 2012)35 49% 29% 21% 
China Times Poll Center (Aug. 2012)36 56.2% 31.3% 12.5% 
United Daily News Poll Center (Dec. 
2012)37 
55% 37% 8% 
Academia Sinica (Apr. 2013)38 52.5% 30.1% 17.4% 
TAPCPR (Jul. 2013)39 52.75% 37.06% 10.19% 
Taiwan Foundation of Democracy (Dec. 
2014)40 
54% 44.6% 1.4% 
Ministry of Justice (Dec. 2015) 56.3% 31.7% 11.6% 
Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (Nov. 
2016)41 
46.3% 45.4% 8.3% 
Nationalist Party (Nov. 2016)42 51.7% 43.3% 5% 
Apple Daily (May 2017)43 34.34% 55.85% 9.81% 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Most of the public opinion polls in relation to the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage mislead us into concluding that Taiwan is ready 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
70 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
for anti-discrimination laws in regard to LGBT people; however, this 
is not at all the case. According to the 2015 Ministry of Justice poll,44 
the ratio of the supporters of same-sex marriage and civil partnership 
to total population was 56.3 per cent, which is approximately equal 
to results from other polls before 2016.  However, the ratio dropped 
dramatically to 34.34 per cent45 only one day after the promulgation 
                                                                                                               
 35 Guoren Dui Tongxinglian Kanfa Mindiao (國人對同性戀看法民調) [Public 
Opinion Poll in Relation to the Public Attitude towards Homosexuality], TVBS POLL 
CENTER (April 2012), http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/PCH/201204/5lge5lexqf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Q8C-KBVF]. 
 36 Guoren Dui Tongxing Hunyin Hefa Hua De Kanfa Diaocha (國人對同性婚姻合法
化的看法調查) [Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the Public Attitude towards Same-sex 
Marriage], CHINA TIMES POLL CENTER (Aug. 23, 2012),  
http://mypaper.pchome.com.tw/miss33lin/post/1323171374  
[https://perma.cc/U642-BSPZ]. 
 37 Mindiao: Tongxing Hunyin: Yes; Zinu Tongzhi: No (民調: 同性婚姻: Yes，子女同
志: No), UNITED DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012),  
https://vision.udn.com/vision/story/7645/737364  
[perma.cc/7GQ2-BFFJ] [hereinafter Public Opinion Poll: Same-sex Marriage: Acceptable; 
Children as LGBT Individuals: Unacceptable]. 
 38 Chang Ying-Hwa et al., Taiwan Social Change Survey 2012, Phase 6, Wave 3, 
ACADEMIA SINICA 308 (2013). 
 39 Guanjian De Shi Nian, Guanjian De 1/4: Tongxing Hunyin Fangdiao Jieguo 
Shuoming (關鍵的十年，關鍵的1/4: 同性婚姻訪調結果說明) [The Crucial Decade and 
the Key Quarter Vote: An Interpretation of the Public Opinion Poll in Relation to Same-sex 
Marriage], UNITED DAILY NEWS POLL CENTER 5 (2013) [https://perma.cc/CJ7J-ARDK]. 
 40 “Tongzhi Hunyin Hefa Hua” Zuixin Diaocha: 2X Sui Minzhong Gaoda 84% Zhichi 
(「同志婚姻合法化」最新調查: 2X歲民眾高達84%支持) [The Latest Public Opinion 
Poll in Relation to the “Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage”: Supported by 84% of the 
Citizens in the Age Group of 20 to 29], SETN (Dec. 8, 2014), 
www.setn.com/News.aspx?PageGroupID=1&NewsID=51829&PageType=1 
[perma.cc/C5MG-8Q73]. 
 41 Yen Chen-Kai, Hunyin Pingquan Zuixin Mindiao: Ting Tong Fan Tong Shi Jun Li 
Di, 40 Sui Yi Xia Ting Tong Ju Duo (婚姻平權最新民調：挺同反同勢均力敵，40歲以下
挺同居多) [The Latest Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the Equality of Marriage: Support 
and Opposition Are Roughly the Same, Citizens under 40 Prefer the Equality of Marriage], 
STORM MEDIA (Nov. 28, 2016), www.storm.mg/article/194927 [perma.cc/UJD4-DRLT]. 
 42 John Wang, Guo Min Dang Gongbu Mindiao: 53% Zancheng Tongxing Hunyin Li 
Zhuanfa (國民黨公佈民調：53%贊成同性婚姻立專法) [The Nationalist Party’s Public 
Opinion Poll: 53% of Citizens Prefer a Special Law for Same-sex Marriage], UNITED 
EVENING NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ettoday.net/news/20161128/819415.htm  
[https://perma.cc/4AZ9-BS7K]. 
 43 Tonghun Shi Xian Yuyin Mindiao (同婚釋憲語音民調), APPLE DAILY (May 25, 
2017), https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/daily/20170525/37662089  
[perma.cc/DT4W-A2RJ] [hereinafter Public Opinion Poll through Phone Calls in Relation 
to the Judicial Yuan’s Decision over Same-sex Marriage]. 
 44 ROC Ministry of Justice, supra note 32. 
 45 Public Opinion Poll through Phone Calls in Relation to the Judicial Yuan’s Decision 
over Same-sex Marriage, supra note 43. 
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of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017].  The public opinion 
poll conducted by Apple Daily on 25 May 2017 reminds us that there 
is a gap between the legalisation of same-sex marriage and that of 
civil partnership.  In other words, the supporters of civil partnership—
21 per cent of the population—do not accept the legalisation of same-
sex marriage, and they might not stand for protection of same-sex 
marriage, as indicated by the Apple Daily poll. 
Another public opinion poll conducted by Taiwan Public 
Opinion Foundation in December 2016 supports the aforementioned 
argument. It indicated that 56 per cent of the population opposed any 
alteration of the traditional definition of marriage defined by the Civil 
Code (1929), and 37.8 per cent of the population supported it.46  In 
addition, 44 percent of the population preferred a special law for 
same-sex unions, and 43.9 per cent of the population were in 
opposition.47  In other words, the majority of Taiwanese still preferred 
to distinguish homosexual unions (by special law) from heterosexual 
marriages (by traditional civil law).  As far as this thesis is concerned, 
this still constitutes discrimination; however, only 25.5 per cent of the 
population agrees.48 
The ongoing controversy in Taiwan about these issues can 
also be read by the poll conducted by the United Daily News in 
December 2012.  It reported that 55 per cent of the population 
supported the legalisation of same-sex unions, but 61 per cent of the 
population confessed that they would not accept their children being 
LGBT.49  According to the poll conducted by the Academia Sinica in 
April 2013, 69.1 per cent of the population agreed that Taiwanese 
parents would be disappointed with LGBT children,50 and 53.7 per 
cent held that it is unacceptable for LGBT lovers to kiss each other 
on the street.51  However, 51.6 per cent accepted public kissing by 
heterosexuals.52 
                                                                                                               
 46 Cheng Hong-Bin, Tai Wan Min Yi Min Diao: 56% Min Zhong Fan Dui Tong Hun 
Min Fa Hua (台灣民意民調：56%民眾反對同婚民法化) [Taiwan’s Public Opinion Poll: 
56% of the Citizens Are Opposed to the Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage via the Civil 
Code], UNITED DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://video.udn.com/news/617825 
[https://perma.cc/3HFD-TRNW]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Wang, supra note 42. 
 49 Public Opinion Poll: Same-sex Marriage: Acceptable; Children as LGBT 
Individuals: Unacceptable, supra note 37. 
 50 Chang Ying-Hwa et al., supra note 38. 
 51 Id. at 308. 
 52 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
72 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
Table 2: Immediacy of Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage, 2016 
Public Opinion Poll Support Oppose N/A 
Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (Nov. 
2016)53 
22.9% 70.7% 6.4% 
Nationalist Party (Nov. 2016)54 21.4% 63.6% 15% 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Table 2 displays Taiwan’s public opinion, in November 2016, 
about the immediacy of legalisation of same-sex marriage.  Polls 
conducted by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation and the 
Nationalist Party showed that at least two-thirds of the total 
population in Taiwan did not consider the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage as an urgency.55  However, when the polls are scrutinised 
according to nuances in the Chinese language, they should be 
interpreted as applying to the immediacy of legalisation for same-sex 
unions, in general.  In other words, the polls ask whether it is urgent 
to protect same-sex unions, and the answer from the Taiwanese 
majority is negative, i.e., the lack of legal protection is currently 
acceptable. 
                                                                                                               
 53 Cheng, supra note 46. 
 54 Wang, supra note 42. 
 55 Cheng, supra note 46; Wang, supra note 42. 
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Table 3: Analysis of the Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage by Age, 
201356 
 <20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 >60 
Consent 28 
(75.68%) 
103 
(77.44%) 
122 
(71.76%) 
98 
(50.78%) 
91 
(45.73%) 
36 
(22.93%) 
Dissent 9 
(24.32%) 
30 
(22.56%) 
48 
(28.24%) 
95 
(49.22%) 
108 
(54.27%) 
121 
(77.07%) 
Chi-square Test: x²=139.721; p=0.000 < 0.05 
(Source: ROC Ministry of Justice) 
However, an associative analysis by age shows that the young 
generation clearly prefers the legalisation of same-sex unions,57 
though it is unclear whether they support the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage or that of civil partnership, because the public opinion poll 
conducted by the Ministry of Justice in December 2013 made no 
distinction between the two forms of legalisation. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
One of the main arguments within Taiwan about the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage58 can be identified as a 
metaphysical debate in relation to the problem of universals59, i.e., is 
same-sex marriage actually marriage?  Such a legal dispute about 
                                                                                                               
 56 ROC Ministry of Justice, Taiwan Tongxing Hunyin Fazhihua Zhi Diaocha Yanjiu 
(台灣同性婚姻法治化之調查研究) [A Study of Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage in 
Taiwan] 64-70 (2003). 
 57 Id. 
 58 This is illustrated by comparing SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) with its appendix. 
 59 See generally GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA, RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM: A 
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 31-42 (2002). 
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“nominalism”60 somehow reveals a fundamental problem of 
Taiwan’s civil law system: the law, which is based upon principles 
only, is too abstract, so that Taiwanese jurists must begin with a 
debate on the precise definition of marriage in accordance with the 
Civil Code (1929).61  However, if we apply common law rules of 
interpretation62 to Taiwan, the core of Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017] is revealed autonomously without being mired in 
philosophical difficulties.  Hence, this thesis rests on the application 
of common law rules of interpretation developed in England and 
Wales63 and accordingly interpreted in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017]. 
It is somehow absurd for legal professionals to argue whether 
same-sex marriage is banned by the present law or not.  It is 
inconceivable to even think that jurists in common law countries 
would argue whether statutory legislation “implies” the consent to 
same-sex marriage or not, rather than applying the presumption 
against an alteration to common law.64  However, this happens in civil 
law countries such as Taiwan.  The lack of precise rules of 
interpretation can enrich the development of legal theories, but it also 
lowers the stability of law and sometimes confuses the core of the 
case. 
Moreover, this thesis studies Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017] through judicial behaviourism, applying both the 
attitudinal and the strategic models to interpret the Justices’ 
adjudication accordingly. 
5. THE INTERESTED PARTIES 
The interested parties in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 
[2017] were Chi Chia-Wei, the Taipei City Government, the Ministry 
of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice. Due to the institutional 
design of the constitutional judicial review, the Judicial Yuan not 
only hears appeals in civil, criminal, and administrative cases from 
                                                                                                               
 60 See generally id. 
 61 See text accompanying note 58. 
 62 See generally ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE & SIOBHAN WEARE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM 38-64 (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2017). 
 63 See generally id. 
 64 NEIL DUXBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION 36-39 (2013). 
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the inferior courts,65 i.e., the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, but also 
grants compulsory advisory opinions to the government agencies 
both ex ante66 and ex post.67  As such, it is sometimes difficult to 
identify both the appellant and the respondent in accordance with the 
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (1948/1993): 
When a government agency, in carrying out its function and 
duty, has doubt about the meanings of a constitutional provision; or, 
when a government agency disputes with other agencies in the 
application of a constitutional provision; or, when a government 
agency has questions on the constitutionality of a statute or regulation 
at issue;68 
When an individual, a legal entity, or a political party, whose 
constitutional right was infringed upon and remedies provided by law 
for such infringement had been exhausted, has questions on the 
constitutionality of the statute or regulation relied thereupon by the 
court of last resort in its final judgment;69 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] consisted of two 
related appeals. The first appeal, requested by the Taipei City 
Government,70 was categorised as a compulsory advisory opinion.  In 
this case, the Taipei City Government was the appellant, but there 
was no respondent by nature.  Hence, both the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Justice were identified as the agencies concerned.  
However, the second appeal was based upon the Supreme 
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014], i.e., Chi 
Chia-Wei v. Taipei City Government;71 thus, both the appellant and 
the respondent were clear. 
                                                                                                               
 65 See SHIZI NO. 371 JIESHI (釋字第371號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 371] 
(1995) (establishing the leapfrog appeal to the Judicial Yuan). 
 66 See e.g., SHIZI NO. 365 JIESHI (釋字第371 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
365] (1994) (requesting a guidance regarding to the amendment of the Civil Code (1929) in 
advance). 
 67 See e.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第342號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
1994] (2017)(requesting a decision in determining the law-making procedure of the congress 
after an act in dispute is enacted). 
 68 Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act of R.O.C. § 5 (1948/1993). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 748] App’x, May 24, 2017 (Taiwan). 
 71 Please be aware that Chi Chia-Wei v. Taipei City Government is not Taiwan’s official 
citation form of the case. The official citation form is: Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行
政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 103 Trial No.521 [2014]. 
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5.1. The Appellant and the Respondent 
It is notable that the Taipei City Government was both the 
appellant and the respondent in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 
(2017).  The appeal was filed by Chi Chia-Wei because of its 
disallowance of same-sex marriage registration according to law;72 
however, the City Government was also the appellant by requesting 
a constitutional judicial review with regard to same-sex marriage.73  
According to the Taipei City Government, it had received more than 
300 requests for same-sex marriage registration in two years’ time, 
and they held this human rights event as non-negligible.74  Hence, the 
Taipei City Government expected the Judicial Yuan to “give the final 
word.”75 
There is no doubt that the Taipei City Government stands for 
same-sex marriage, though it must reject same-sex marriage 
registration under rule of law.  The City Mayor, Ko Wen-Je, 
enunciated that the appeal of constitutional judicial review indicates 
the “gesture”76 of the City Government on same-sex marriage.  Such 
a political gesture on human rights issues and rule of law is typically 
Taipei style; in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.618 [2006], the City 
Government also rejected the petition under rule of law, but 
encouraged the petitioner, Xie Hong-Mei, to sue the City 
Government for discrimination.77 
The main argument about same-sex marriage submitted by 
the City Government asserted that the freedom of marriage is 
                                                                                                               
 72 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]; Supreme 
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014]; Shizi No. 748 Jieshi (釋字第
748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017). 
 73 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 74 Chu Tse-Wei et al., Tonghun Shixian An: Bei Shi Fu: Yin Wujie Chansheng Duili 
(同婚釋憲案 北市府：因誤解產生對立) [About the Constitutional Judicial Review in 
Relation to Same-sex Marriage, Taipei City Government: The Opposition Roots in the 
Misunderstanding], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 24, 2017),  
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/201703240183-1.aspx [perma.cc/HEA5-RJH3]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Jiang Yu-Kuei, Tong Hun Shi Xian Mai Da Bu: Ko Wen-Je: Zhe Shi Yi Zhong Tai 
Du (同婚釋憲邁大步 柯文哲：這是一種態度) [The Constitutional Judicial Review in 
Relation to Same-sex Marriage Is A Big Step Forward: Ko Wen-Je: This Is A Gesture], NOW 
NEWS (May 24, 2017),  
https://www.nownews.com/news/20170524/2536079 [perma.cc/74TM-H47R]. 
 77 SHIZI NO. 618 JIESHI (釋字第618號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 618] 
(2006). 
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constitutionally protected78 and “[a]ll the freedoms and rights 
enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law 
except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the 
freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain 
social order or to advance public welfare.”79  But the freedom of 
marriage is de jure restricted to heterosexual marriage by the Civil 
Code (1929): “An agreement to marry shall be made by the male and 
the female parties in their own concord.”80  In other words, Article 
972 of the Civil Code (1929) deprived LGBT individuals of the 
freedom to marry because the freedom to choose a spouse in a same-
sex marriage is de jure excluded.81 
Moreover, the Taipei City Government argued that it is 
unconstitutional to ban same-sex marriage in accordance with Article 
23 of the Constitution.82  The City Government applied the doctrine 
of clausula rebus sic stantibus, asserting expressly that the freedom 
of marriage that rests on the social understanding of marriage nearly 
90 years ago is disproportional;83 the City Government hinted that the 
civil law is out of date.84  Based on the principle of proportionality,85 
the City Government doubted the legality of the definition of 
marriage provided by Article 972 of the Civil Code (1929), because 
the prohibition against same-sex marriage cannot “advance public 
welfare” and has nothing to do with “social order.”86  Hence, the 
freedom to marry cannot be restricted to heterosexual couples.87 
Finally, the Taipei City Government asserted88 that the ban 
against same-sex marriage is incompatible with the principle of 
                                                                                                               
 78 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 22 (1947) (Taiwan) with Shizi No. 552 Jieshi (釋字
第552號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 552] (2002). 
 79 See MINGUO XIANFA art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan) (stipulating the principle of 
proportionality). 
 80 Minfa (民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 972 (1929) (Taiwan). 
 81 Compare Minfa (民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 972 (1929) (Taiwan) with Minfa 
(民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 982 (1929/2007) (Taiwan) (applying the doctrine of 
noscitur a sociis that the term of agreement to marry implies the term of marriage). 
 82 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 MINGUO XIANFA art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 748] Appendix: Chi Chia-Wei’s Petition, May 24, 2017 (Taiwan). 
 88 Id. 
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equality embodied in the Constitution.89  Article 972 of the Civil 
Code (1929) has deprived LGBT people in Taiwan of the freedom to 
marry and directly constitutes discrimination against them.90 
5.2. The Appellant Chi Chia-Wei 
Chi Chia-Wei was the first person in Taiwan to have publicly 
identified himself as LGBT,91 and he has fought for same-sex 
marriage in Taiwan for 30 years.92  His registration of same-sex 
marriage was rejected by the Wanhua Household Registration Office 
of Taipei on 22 March 2013,93 and the petition for reconsideration 
was dismissed on 29 May.94  He subsequently appealed to the Taipei 
High Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court; 
however, both appeals were dismissed.95 
In Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit 
No.931 [2014], Judge Hu Fang-Xin held that same-sex marriage is 
literally excluded by the Civil Code (1929) because the Code 
provides the meaning of the words within the statute.  In other words, 
the High Administrative Court had no power to modify the meaning 
of marriage decided by the legislature.  Moreover, the Court held that 
Article 23II of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) does not imply or hold any basis for the legitimisation 
of same-sex marriage.  Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal.96 
In Supreme Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial 
No.521 [2014], Judge Huang He-Wen affirmed the decision in Taipei 
High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014].  He 
further indicated that the Court interpreted the Civil Code (1929) in 
accordance with the purposive rule97 and found same-sex marriage 
                                                                                                               
 89 MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan). 
 90 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
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 91 Id. 
 92 AFP, Chi Chia-Wei Eyes End to 30-Year Gay Marriage Fight, TAIPEI TIMES (May 
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 95 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]; Supreme 
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014]. 
 96 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]. 
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss1/4
2019] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.  79 
incompatible.  It seems that the Court read marriage as common law, 
so that same-sex marriage cannot be deemed lawful because of the 
presumption against an alteration to common law:98 “[S]tatutes are to 
be interpreted in the light of the common law. . . .  [S]tatutes are not 
presumed to make any alteration in the common law further, or 
otherwise, than the act does expressly declare.”99  Hence, the Court 
also dismissed the appeal.100 
Chi Chia-Wei appealed the Supreme Administrative Court 
Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014] on 20 August 2015.  His main 
argument101 rested on the principle of equality embodied in the 
Constitution.102  He asserted that Article 7 of the Constitution (1947) 
presumes against discrimination unless and until it is proved 
necessary;103 hence, he requested that the legal definition of marriage 
be subject to strict scrutiny104 for the sake of equal protection.105  
Moreover, he linked the legalisation of same-sex marriage with the 
international standard of human rights, persuading the Justices to 
override the definition of marriage provided by the Civil Code 
(1929).106 
However, there were many paradoxical assertions within Chi 
Chia-Wei’s instrument of appeal.  He argued that there is no written 
restriction against same-sex marriage provided by the Civil Code 
(1929) when he blamed the courts for misinterpretation; yet he later 
altered his argument and claimed that the prohibition of same-sex 
marriage stipulated by the Civil Code (1929) constitutes 
discrimination against homosexual orientation.107  Moreover, he 
                                                                                                               
 [https://perma.cc/NG94-DALT]. 
 98 DUXBURY, supra note 64. 
 99 GUSTAV ADOLF ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES 
173 (Lawbook Exchange 2006) (1888). 
 100 Supreme Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014]. 
 101 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 102 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan) with MINGUO XIANFA art. 23 
(1947) (Taiwan). 
 103 NIGEL N.T. LI (李念祖), ANLI XIANFA III: RENQUAN BAOZHANG DE NEIRONG (案 
例憲法III（下）─人權保障的內容) [CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDIES III: THE MERIT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION], BOOK 2 476-478 (2006). 
 104 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 105 CHUCK STEWART, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 185 (2001). 
 106 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] 
App’x (2017). 
 107 Id. 
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persuaded the Justices to legalise same-sex marriage in Taiwan in 
order to meet the international human rights standard by telling the 
Justices that only one-tenth of the countries in the world had legalised 
same-sex marriage.108  It was even more problematic that after he 
devoted space and energy to arguments based on international law, 
he later argued that the Constitution is supreme and international law 
is inferior.109 
5.3. The Agencies Concerned 
On a strict view, there is no attorney general in Taiwan 
because the Prosecutor General of the Republic of China does not 
“fill the role of legal advisor”110 to the government.  However, the 
Ministry of the Interior, as the prime agency concerned in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017], requested an advisory opinion 
provided by the Ministry of Justice and directly “[deferred] to the 
MOJ’s opinions on the constitutionality of the Marriage Chapter.”111  
Hence, the advisory opinion112 served as the main argument of the 
agencies concerned, and the Ministry of Justice was thus directly 
involved. 
The first argument of the Ministry of Justice was based upon 
the presumption against an alteration to common law.113  It asserted 
that the definition of marriage embodied in the Civil Code (1929) has 
been established by custom and ethics for thousands of years, and the 
Code simply respects that tradition.114  Hence, the definition of 
marriage in the Code definitely excludes same-sex marriage.115  In 
addition, the Ministry of Justice argued that the definition of marriage 
established by custom and ethics demands respect and constitutes a 
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 110 GABRIELLE APPLEBY, THE ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL: NEGOTIATING LAW, 
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common law right,116 and the Civil Code (1929) does not serve to 
alter any common law right unless it clearly says so.117 
The second argument of the Ministry of Justice indicated that 
the freedom to marry is not a constitutional right until the Justices say 
it is, because nothing in the Constitution addresses the issue.118  
Moreover, in accordance with precedent, the Justices have never 
granted the freedom to enter into same-sex marriage.119  Therefore, 
the Ministry of Justice cast strong doubt on the legality of same-sex 
marriage in Taiwan.120 
The third argument of the Ministry of Justice rested on the 
“mischief rule.”121  According to the Constitution, “All citizens of the 
Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party 
affiliation, shall be equal before the law.”122  However, the Ministry 
of Justice argued that it is irrational to allege that the Constitution 
permits same-sex marriage because the aforementioned 
constitutional Article only intends to protect gender equality between 
men and women;123 the term “sex” adopted in the Constitution is 
“men (Nan) and women (Nu).” Hence, the Ministry of Justice 
asserted that there are no equality rights of same-sex marriage found 
in the Constitution.124  The presumption of constitutional protection 
for same-sex marriage implies the presumption of Chinese 
acceptance of LGBT individuals in the 1940s, which is not true. 
Finally, the Ministry of Justice asserted that same-sex 
marriage is not yet a universal value in Taiwan; thus, it is premature 
to acknowledge same-sex marriage as a constitutional right.125  
Moreover, international law imposes no obligation on countries to 
legalise same-sex marriage, so it is disproportional to legalise same-
sex marriage at this point.126  In other words, the Ministry of Justice 
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disagreed with granting a constitutional right that is not yet deemed a 
universal value in Taiwan.127 
6. JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO.748 [2017] 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748 [2017] was appealed by 
Chi Chia-Wei on 20 August 2015128 and by the Taipei City 
Government on 4 November 2015.129  The two appeals were 
consolidated by the Justices, and conditional leave was granted on 10 
February 2017.130  The case was heard by 14 of the 15 Justices131 on 
24 March 2017,132 and the decision was promulgated on 24 May.133  
The Justices held unconstitutional the pertinent provisions of the 
Civil Code (1929) in relation to marriage and said: 
The provisions of [ . . . ] the Civil Code do not allow two 
persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of intimate and 
exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life.  The said 
provisions, to the extent of such failure, are in violation of 
constitution’s guarantees of both the people’s freedom of marriage 
under Article 22 and the people’s right to equality under Article 7.134 
The reasoning of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] 
began with Chi Chia-Wei’s long march towards the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage.135  The Justices affirmed that “[f]or more than 
three decades, Chia-Wei Chi has been appealing to the legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments for the right to same-sex 
marriage.”136  However, “after more than a decade, the [Legislative 
Yuan] is still unable to pass the legislation regarding same-sex 
marriage”137 and “it is still uncertain when these bills will be 
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reviewed on the floor of the [Legislative Yuan].”138  Hence, the Court 
justified its political intervention and issued a court order for same-
sex marriage: 
The authorities concerned shall amend or enact the laws as 
appropriate, in accordance with the ruling of this Interpretation, 
within two years from the announcement of this Interpretation.  It is 
within the discretion of the authorities concerned to determine the 
formality for achieving the equal protection of the freedom of 
marriage.  If the authorities concerned fail to amend or enact the laws 
as appropriate within the said two years, two persons of the same sex 
who intend to create the said permanent union shall be allowed to 
have their marriage registration effectuated at the authorities in 
charge of household registration, by submitting a written document 
signed by two or more witnesses in accordance with the said Marriage 
Chapter.139 
It is obvious that the Justices prefer the legalisation of same-
sex unions, but we do not know the type of legalisation that they 
prefer—same-sex marriage or civil partnership.  However, it can be 
reasonably asserted that the Justices deliberately made a strategic 
decision140 that leaves “the formality for achieving the equal 
protection of the freedom of marriage”141 to “the authorities 
concerned,”142 i.e., the Legislative Yuan.  The evidence is actually 
provided by the Justices themselves.  If the Justices are capable of 
issuing a court order that authorises LGBT individuals to “have their 
marriage registration effectuated at the authorities in charge of 
household registration, by submitting a written document signed by 
two or more witnesses”143 when “the authorities concerned fail to 
amend or enact the laws as appropriate within the said two years,”144 
then the Justices are constitutionally powerful enough to unilaterally 
decide the proper form of the legalisation of same-sex unions.  In 
other words, they did not want to make a firm decision on the form 
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that legalisation would take and thus strategically ordered “the 
authorities concerned”145 to do so. 
Moreover, the Justices not only described Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.748 [2017] as a case with “the very controversial 
social and political issues of whether homosexuals shall have the 
autonomy to choose whom to marry, and of whether they shall enjoy 
the equal protection of the same freedom of marriage as 
heterosexuals,”146 but they also indicated the legal ground for judicial 
intervention: concerning human rights, the Judicial Yuan has the 
jurisdiction to scrutinise even legislative omissions:147 
[T]he timetable for such legislative solution is hardly 
predictable now and yet these petitions concern the protection of 
people’s fundamental rights.  It is the constitutional duty of this Court 
to render a binding judicial decision, in time, on issues concerning 
the safeguarding of constitutional basic values.  [ . . . ] For these 
reasons, this Court [ . . . ] has made its best efforts in granting review 
of these petitions and, after holding oral hearing on the designated 
date, has made this Interpretation to address the above constitutional 
issues.148 
It appears that the Justices attempted to communicate with 
their audiences149 through their ruling, and we may also identify 
whom they aimed to communicate with.150  When the Justices defend 
judicial intervention in a case that involves political controversy, their 
audience is not the general public151 (because it is unnecessary to 
explain “the principle of mutual respect among governmental 
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powers”152), but the Legislative Yuan.153  Furthermore, it is also 
unnecessary to discuss the counter-majoritarian difficulty154 unless 
the audience is the law society.155  Hence, the Justices in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] considered the Legislative Yuan 
and the law society as their crucial audiences, and we posit that the 
reason is based upon statistics: Taiwanese public opinion in regard to 
the legalisation of same-sex marriage is divided, so the Justices could 
not obtain public support under such a circumstance.156 
The Justices’ statement in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017] not only reflects their political concern but also 
exposes their preference for same-sex unions; when public opinion is 
divided, the Judicial Yuan’s precedents suggest either the application 
of the political question doctrine157 or procedural dismissal158 
(Beschluss).  Nevertheless, in this ruling the Justices did not follow 
these patterns, and it is likely that legalisation of same-sex unions was 
their policy preference.159 
Those prior [Judicial Yuan] Interpretations mentioning 
“husband and wife” or “a man and a woman” were made within the 
context of opposite-sex marriage, in terms of the factual backgrounds 
of the original cases from which they arose. [ . . . ]  Thus far, this 
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Court has not made any Interpretation on the issue of whether two 
persons of the same sex are allowed to marry each other.160 
The first announcement of the Justices in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.748 [2017] was that the decision in this case was 
given per incuriam, and it is over-interpretative to assert that the 
Court’s precedents constituted any protection against the prohibition 
of same-sex marriage.161  Moreover, the Justices affirmed that the 
Civil Code (1929) provides no space for same-sex marriage in 
accordance with the noscitur a sociis doctrine that the term of 
agreement to marry implies the term of marriage.162  In other words, 
the Justices upheld that same-sex marriage is legally banned in 
Taiwan, which establishes this controversy as a constitutional issue, 
and the interpretatio authentica of such a circumstance is reserved 
exclusively for the Judicial Yuan.163  Hence, the Justices affirmed 
that: 
Unspoused persons eligible to marry shall have their freedom 
of marriage, which includes the freedom to decide “whether to 
marry” and “whom to marry.”  [ . . . ] Such decisional autonomy is 
vital to the sound development of personality and safeguarding of 
human dignity, and therefore is a fundamental right to be protected 
by Article 22 of the Constitution.  [ . . . ] Furthermore, the freedom of 
marriage for two persons of the same sex, once legally recognized, 
will constitute the bedrock of a stable society, together with opposite-
sex marriage.  The need, capability, willingness and longing, in both 
physical and psychological senses, for creating such permanent 
unions of intimate and exclusive nature are equally essential to 
homosexuals and heterosexuals, given the importance of the freedom 
of marriage to the sound development of personality and 
safeguarding of human dignity. Both types of union shall be protected 
by the freedom of marriage under Article 22 of the Constitution.164 
The main reason the Justices preferred same-sex unions rests 
on “the sound development of personality and safeguarding of human 
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dignity,”165 by which they disagreed with the legal classification of 
“permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature”166 between 
heterosexuality and homosexuality.  Such an opinion should not be 
overinterpreted; it does not mean that the Justices found no difference 
between the two; however, it surely means that the Justices did not 
consider the “permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature”167 
as an exclusive right for heterosexual couples.168  We hold that this 
was the Justices’ sincere and attitudinal169 decision.  The Justices held 
that: 
The current Marriage Chapter only provides for the 
permanent union between a man and a woman, without providing that 
two persons of the same sex may also create an identical permanent 
union. This constitutes a classification on the basis of sexual 
orientation, which gives homosexuals relatively unfavorable 
treatment in their freedom of marriage.170 
The “ideological attitudes and values of the [J]ustices”171 can 
be read by the Justices’ interpretations of Articles 7 and 22 of the 
Constitution of 1947.  The two Articles state nothing with respect to 
the right to same-sex marriage; Article 7 provides that “[a]ll citizens 
of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or 
party affiliation, shall be equal before the law;”172 and Article 22 
stipulates that “[a]ll other freedoms and rights of the people that are 
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed 
under the Constitution.”173  However, the Justices interpreted that 
“[t]he five classifications of impermissible discrimination set forth in 
[Article 7] are only illustrative, rather than exhaustive.  Therefore, 
different treatment based on other classifications, such as disability 
                                                                                                               
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at ¶ 15. 
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or sexual orientation, shall also be governed by the right to equality 
under the said Article.”174  Moreover, the linkage between Article 22 
and same-sex marriage is that “[g]iven its close relation to the 
freedom of personality and human dignity, the freedom of marriage 
promised by Article 22 of the Constitution is a fundamental right;”175 
thus “the provisions of the Marriage Chapter are incompatible with 
the spirit and meaning of the freedom of marriage as protected by 
Article 22 of the Constitution.”176  In other words, the right of same-
sex marriage in Taiwan is a constitutional right created by (or, at least, 
interpreted by) the Justices177 because the Constitution stipulates 
nothing at all. 
Based upon this judge-made constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage, the Justices affirmed that prohibition of same-sex unions is 
unconstitutional178 for the following three reasons: 
1. The Justices asserted that “sexual orientation is an 
immutable characteristic that is resistant to change.”179  Hence, it is 
incorrect to deem homosexuality a disease.180  On a contrary, it is 
appropriate to classify LGBT individuals into a sort of “ethic and 
social” minority that requires affirmative action measures181 in order 
to fulfil the genuine equality provided by the Constitution.182 
2. The Court disagreed with the assertion that 
procreation is integral to an essential definition of marriage because 
there is no such legal obligation for heterosexual couples.183  Hence, 
it is surely irrational184 to burden homosexual couples with 
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procreation.  Vice versa, it is inequitable to prohibit same-sex unions 
because of the impossibility of procreation.185 
3. The Justices could not find a linkage between the 
degeneracy of moral order and the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage186 because, as far as this thesis is concerned, the Justices 
replaced “the concept of moral order” by “that of moral order within 
heterosexual marriage,”187 i.e., disguised displacement.  The Justices 
did not answer the question of whether or not legalisation of same-
sex marriage may lay bare the moral bankruptcy of the entire society, 
yet they asserted that “the basic ethical orders built upon the existing 
institution of opposite-sex marriage will remain unaffected, even if 
two persons of the same sex are allowed to enter into a legally-
recognized marriage.”188  Hence, it is disproportional to prohibit 
same-sex unions.189 
In a nutshell, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] 
comprised both sincere and strategic decisions.  It is likely that the 
Justices sympathised with LGBT individuals and thus sincerely 
preferred the legalisation of same-sex marriage.  The Justices may be 
criticised in light of the countermajoritarian difficulty190 when public 
opinion in Taiwan is divided, but they did not apply the political 
question doctrine.191  Moreover, the Justices even attempted to pacify 
opponents of same-sex marriage with the following words: 
This Interpretation leaves unchanged the party status as well 
as the related rights and obligations for the institution of opposite-sex 
marriage under the current Marriage Chapter.  This Interpretation 
only addresses the issues of whether the provisions of the Marriage 
Chapter, which do not allow two persons of the same sex to create a 
permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of 
living a common life together, violate the freedom of marriage 
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protected by Article 22 and the right to equality guaranteed by Article 
7 of the Constitution.192 
However, we also note that the Justices avoided deciding the 
legal form of legalisation for same-sex unions—either “marriage” or 
“civil partnership.”193  As indicated earlier, public opinion in 
Taiwan194 in regard to the legal form of same-sex unions is divided,195 
so the Justices could not obtain public support under such a 
circumstance.196  Hence, we observe how the Justices avoided being 
criticised in light of the separation of powers argument197 and the 
countermajoritarian difficulty;198 they justified their judicial 
behaviour voluntarily, by which we posit that they made the decision 
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] under political 
pressure. 
7. JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
There were two additional judicial opinions submitted in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]: the partial dissenting 
opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya199 and the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Wu Chen-Huan.200  Both opinions implied a preference for 
the application of the political question doctrine,201 because both 
argued that the definition of marriage must be decided by democratic 
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means.202  However, Justice Huang Horng-Shya voted for the 
legalisation of same-sex unions, albeit without indicating the precise 
form;203 and Justice Wu Chen-Huan clearly opposed the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage without mentioning his opinion about the 
legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships.204 
7.1. Partial Dissenting Opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the partial dissenting 
opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya205 was not so much a judicial 
opinion as sentimental propaganda.  It began with a theatrical and 
sensational proclamation that “we are all brothers and sisters who live 
together in Taiwan, and all of you are my preciouses . . . .”206  Some 
might say that (female) Justice Huang Horng-Shya was simply 
expressing a maternal view; however, this does not constitute a 
judicial opinion under normal expectations.207  Moreover, this partial 
dissenting opinion208 seems to be a political statement as to how 
difficult it was to render a judicial decision under public pressure, 
which implies the Justices’ awareness of the division of public 
opinion, i.e., Justice Huang Horng-Shya’s obiter dictum, “all of you 
are my preciouses.”209  Nevertheless, the unusual dissonance between 
the expected formality of a judicial opinion and Justice Huang Horng-
Shya’s partial dissenting opinion does not depreciate the value of her 
points. 
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Justice Huang Horng-Shya clearly announced that she voted 
to legalise same-sex unions, albeit with ambiguity about the form of 
legalisation.210  She argued philosophically that change is an 
everlasting principle of the universe, thus change is normal and 
constancy is abnormal.211  Based on this idea, she argued, apparently 
with the mass public as her intended audience, that everything 
changes as time goes on, including the concept of marriage, so that 
we should accept and bless same-sex unions.212 
However, Justice Huang Horng-Shya disagreed with the 
majority opinion in regard to the freedom of marriage.213  She noted 
that it is entirely illogical to apply the freedom of marriage to same-
sex marriage if the Judicial Yuan fails to redefine “marriage” in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]214, i.e., there would be no 
freedom of same-sex marriage if the definition of marriage remained 
unchanged.  Furthermore, she doubted whether the Justices had the 
authority to redefine “marriage,”215 and it appears that Justice Huang 
Horng-Shya preferred the application of the political question 
doctrine216 to the concrete judicial decision. 
Justice Huang Horng-Shya also asserted that it is untrue to 
claim that there is no difference between heterosexual and 
homosexual unions.217  Hence, it is inequitable to demand that the law 
in relation to heterosexual marriage should be the same as the law in 
relation to homosexual unions.218  One of the examples provided by 
Justice Huang Horng-Shya was that she did not directly consider the 
distinction between male and female as sexual discrimination unless 
the distinction was unreasonable.219  In other words, she held that the 
distinction between same-sex unions and heterosexual marriage does 
not directly constitute an infringement against equality.220 
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7.2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Wu Chen-Huan 
The dissenting opinion submitted by Justice Wu Chen-Huan 
shows that he strongly opposed the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage,221 though we do not know whether he also opposed the 
legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships.222  Justice Wu Chen-Huan 
obtained his doctorate (S.J.D.) at Bond University, Australia, and he 
served as a chief prosecutor before being appointed as a Justice.  
Hence, it is not surprising that in accordance with his career 
background he preferred the legal opinion submitted by the Ministry 
of Justice.223 
Justice Wu Chen-Huan held that the freedom of marriage 
protected by the Constitution of 1947 is limited to heterosexual 
unions, and any change in the definition of marriage should be 
decided democratically.224  He argued, in accordance with Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria [2010] ECHR 1996 and Vallanatos and Others v. 
Greece [2013] ECHR 1110, that marriage is an “institution”225 with 
“deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ 
largely from one society to another.”226  Hence, it is irrational to 
legalise same-sex marriage in accordance with a global trend.227  
Moreover, Justice Wu Chen-Huan asserted that the Constitution does 
not recognise same-sex marriage, and all of the Judicial Yuan’s 
precedents were decided on the basis of heterosexual marriage.228 
As an expert in international law, Justice Wu Chen-Huan 
provided substantial citation from that field to support his argument 
that the legalisation of same-sex marriage is not yet an international 
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standard of fundamental rights.229  He also provided a list of the 
countries that have legalised same-sex marriage and doubted whether 
it is reasonable to consider legalisation as an international standard230, 
i.e., there are only 21 out of 193 countries that have legalised same-
sex marriage, which cannot constitute a standard.231 
8. CONCLUSION 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] opened the gate 
for the legalisation of same-sex unions in Taiwan; however, it did not 
determine the precise form of legalisation,232 and we still do not know 
whether Taiwan will legalise same-sex “marriage” or same-sex “civil 
partnership” before the given judicial deadline for a legislative 
change, i.e., 23 May 2019.233  The Judicial Yuan’s court order only 
extends to the legalisation of same-sex unions (sincere decision) but 
leaves the political hot potato to the Legislative Yuan (strategic 
decision).234  If the official form of legalisation of same-sex unions 
angers the public, the Legislative Yuan will bear the criticism, rather 
than the Judicial Yuan. 
We believe that the theories presented in Section 2 
(Theoretical Insights) mirror how the Justices read the same-sex 
marriage case, though they did not express their real views.  In 
reading the reasoning presented in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.748 [2017], we can discover that the Justices were not interested 
in the definition of marriage, nor the debate as to whether the Civil 
Code (1929) effectively prohibited same-sex marriage or not.235  The 
Justices’ attention was always very clear: this is nothing less than an 
issue of human equality.236  Hence, the Justices responded to the 
principle of equality237 and linked up the freedom of marriage238 with 
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this principle,239 thus holding unconstitutional the prohibition of 
same-sex marriage because it constitutes clear discrimination against 
LGBT individuals.240 
However, the partial dissenting opinion of Justice Huang 
Horng-Shya241 and the dissenting opinion of Justice Wu Chen-
Huan242 both suggested applying the political question doctrine 
because of the countermajoritarian difficulty.243  This implies that 
both Justices disagreed with the legalisation of same-sex marriage 
outside the context of legislative action.244  If the majority in Taiwan 
really preferred the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the Legislative 
Yuan would naturally take over the problem and there would be no 
need for the Judicial Yuan to make any concrete decision at all. 
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